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The Role of Civilian Organizations 
 with Prison Access and Citizen  
Members—The New York  
Experience 
 
John M. Brickman 
 
“You can only expect what you inspect.”1 
 
Even as incarceration represents the most intrusive power 
of the state, the deprivation of citizens’ liberty, we demand that 
modern government be transparent and accountable.  But no 
government institution presents more opacity, and is less 
answerable, than the prison.  The independent civilian 
overseer addresses and ameliorates the conundrum. 
New York offers two models of citizen oversight2 agencies 
for correctional facilities, one a private organization with 
statutory rights of prison access and the other a government 
agency with powers mandated by law.  The Correctional 
Association of New York, which visits and inspects state 
prisons, is non-governmental but operates with citizen 
volunteers and a professional staff under a legislative grant of 
authority.  The New York City Board of Correction, a New York 
 

Mr. Brickman served as the Executive Director of the New York City 
Board of Correction (1971-75) and the Chair of the Board of The Correctional 
Association of New York (2005-08).  He is a member of Ackerman, Levine, 
Cullen, Brickman & Limmer, LLP, located in Great Neck, New York, where 
he practices commercial litigation, and is also a Commissioner of the New 
York State Commission on Public Integrity.  He speaks and writes regularly 
on issues relating to prisons and jails, as well as lawyers’ ethics.  Mr. 
Brickman received his B.A. degree from The Johns Hopkins University in 
1966, and his J.D., cum laude, from Columbia University School of Law in 
1969.  This paper presents an expanded version of his presentation at the 
“Opening of a Closed World” conference. 
1. JACK MAPLE & CHRIS MITCHELL, THE CRIME FIGHTER: HOW YOU CAN 
MAKE YOUR COMMUNITY CRIME FREE 187-88 (1999). 
2. A civilian overseer is someone who is not a correctional professional, 
or at the very least, someone who may have worked in corrections but no 
longer does, and hence presents the prospect of independence. 
1
2010] THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 1563 
City government agency, oversees city correctional facilities 
and functions with unpaid board members appointed by 
different (and sometimes competing) branches of government, 
assisted by a professional staff.3  Each body offers lessons for 
effective oversight. 
In existence for 166 years, the Correctional Association 
enjoys the statutory right of access to New York state prisons.4  
From its organization in 1844, the Association has sent citizen 
volunteers to visit, monitor, and evaluate New York state 
correctional facilities.  Since 1846, the Association has had the 
right, by statute, to visit state correctional facilities.5  It guards 
its privilege vigorously and exercises it frequently.  The 
Association typically visits ten or more state prisons annually 
and prepares and presents detailed reports on its visits to the 
Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS,” the agency that 
operates the facilities), the legislature, and the public.6  It also 
issues extensive topical reports7 and conducts public education 
 
3. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 626 (1977). 
4. Chapter 163 of the Laws of 1846, which incorporated the Prison 
Association of New York (its original title; the name changed in 1961), 
provided that the executive committee of the Association,  
 
[b]y such committees as they shall from time to time 
appoint, shall have power, and it shall be their duty to visit, 
inspect and examine, all the prisons in the state, and 
annually report to the legislature their state and conditions, 
and all such other things in regard to them as may enable 
the legislature to perfect their government and discipline. 
 
1846 N.Y. Laws ch. 163, § 6, available at 
http://www.correctionhistory.org/html/chronicl/cany/html/cany02a.html. 
4. The Association is a New York not-for-profit corporation with tax-
exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code.  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 
(2006). 
5. Accordingly, the Association plays a rare, perhaps unique, role in the 
oversight of American prisons.  Its only counterpart appears to be the 
Pennsylvania Prison Society, the authorized members of which may visit 
Pennsylvania correctional institutions.  61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3512, 
3513 (West 2009). 
6. For a roster of available reports, see Correctional Association of New 
York, Reports and Policy Briefings, 
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publications/reports.htm (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2010). 
7. See, e.g., CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., HEALTHCARE IN NEW YORK PRISONS 2004-
2007 (2009), available at 
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publications/download/pvp/issue_repor
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/13
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programs. 
In its early years, the roster of Correctional Association 
citizen volunteers included New York’s most prominent, and 
accordingly, most affluent men (until the twentieth century, 
Correctional Association activists were virtually all male).  
They included Theodore Roosevelt, John D. Rockefeller, 
Andrew Carnegie, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Benjamin F. Butler 
(Attorney General of the United States and later United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York), John J. Astor, 
Jr., Samuel F. B. Morse, Jacob H. Schiff, and a host of other 
names that are recognizable instantly as representative of New 
York’s elite. 
The profile of the Correctional Association visitor has 
changed dramatically.  In addition to prominent citizens, 
Association volunteers now include men and women with 
diverse racial, ethnic, economic, educational, and vocational 
backgrounds.  Some have long advocated the improvement of 
prison conditions and programs.  Others have enjoyed 
distinguished professional careers as physicians and lawyers, 
or in academia.  In addition, the list includes ex-offenders, 
whose special experiences present an irreplaceable resource for 
the work of the Association, indeed for any monitor of prison 
operations, programs, and conditions. 
The New York City Board of Correction was established in 
1957, upon adoption of Section 626 of the City Charter.8  Its 
powers and duties have included, among others, the inspection 
and visitation “at any time9 of all institutions and facilities 
under the jurisdiction” of the New York City Department of 
 
ts/Healthcare_Report_2004-07.pdf. 
8. For a history of the Board of Correction, see Annette Gordon-Reed, 
Watching the Protectors: Independent Oversight of Municipal Law 
Enforcement Agencies, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 87, 91-105 (1995).  See also 
Harold Baer, Jr. & Arminda Bepko, A Necessary and Proper Role for Federal 
Courts in Prison Reform: The Benjamin v. Malcolm Consent Decrees, 52 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 3, 18 n.62 (2008). 
9. Charter revision approved in 1975, infra note 12 and accompanying 
text, added the phrase “at any time.”  The City Charter Revision Commission 
included the phrase in the referendum at the suggestion of the Board, which 
was concerned about limitation on its access that jail administrators might 
impose.  The original charter language, which governed until the 
effectiveness of the changes approved in 1977, provided simply for “[t]he 
inspection and visitation of all institutions and facilities under the 
jurisdiction of the department.” 
3
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Correction, which operates the city’s jail and prison system;10 
the inspection of all department records; the evaluation of 
departmental performance; and the establishment of grievance 
procedures for inmates and department employees.11 
In a major expansion of the Board’s authority, beyond its 
initial “relatively undefined mandate,”12 a 1977 City Charter 
amendment gave the Board the additional power to establish 
minimum standards for the “care, custody, correction, 
treatment, supervision, and discipline of all persons held or 
confined under the jurisdiction of the Department.”13  Since the 
amendment, the Board also has had the power to issue 
subpoenas, conduct hearings, require the attendance of 
witnesses, and compel the production of documents.14 
From the establishment of the Board until 1977, the mayor 
selected all nine members and appointed its chair.  
Consequently, the Board was only as independent and 
aggressive as the mayor wished, and a mayor who preferred 
seeming harmony, or to avoid public criticism of one mayoral 
appointee (the correction commissioner) by others (the Board), 
had the obvious opportunity to defang the Board.  In practice, 
mayors have taken various approaches.  For example, Rudolph 
Giuliani tried repeatedly to abolish the Board.15  Conversely, 
 
10. The mayor appoints the Commissioner of Correction (chief executive 
of the Department of Correction), who has responsibility for the operation of 
the department.  N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 623. 
11. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 626. 
12. Gordon-Reed, supra note 8, at 92.  An empowered Board (and 
especially an active and independent chair) can use the Board’s influence to 
bring progressive change to the jails.  William J. vanden Heuvel, who chaired 
the Board from its revitalization in October 1970 until February 1973, 
provided a remarkable example of provocative leadership, even before the 
Board had power to set minimum standards for the Department of 
Correction.  Under vanden Heuvel, the Board and its staff visited institutions 
regularly, exercising the singular power that gives the Board purpose and 
permits it to fulfill its mandate. 
13. N.Y. CITY CHARTER, ch. 25, § 626(e) (1977) (adopted by referendum in 
1975, effective January 1, 1977).  Board members recognized the risks of 
their added duties.  At a board meeting before the referendum, member 
David A. Schulte reminded colleagues that adopting the expansion would 
change the nature of members’ responsibilities, and noted that some might 
not welcome the new burdens.  As the staff head, I attended that meeting. 
14. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 626(g). 
15. See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, Rikers Is Tense as Cuts Loom, and 
Official Warns of Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1994, at B1; Alison Mitchell 
Council Passes a Deficit-Cutting Package, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at B7; 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/13
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after riots raged throughout the department in October 1970, 
John V. Lindsay revived the Board by appointing William J. 
vanden Heuvel as chair, and tolerated, indeed welcomed, the 
Board as activist foil to the department, a move that lead to the 
“retirement” of the incumbent correction commissioner.16 
It was clear that allowing the mayor to appoint, and thus 
control, both the watchdog and the watched made little sense.  
Accordingly, since the 1977 City Charter changes, the mayor 
has shared the authority to appoint board members with the 
City Council (the city’s legislative body) and the presiding 
justices of the Appellate Division for the First and Second 
Judicial Departments (the two intermediate state appellate 
courts located in the city).17  Each appoints three members for 
terms of six years, with staggered expirations.18 
Although the mayor appoints the chair, the arrangement is 
structured to avoid mayoral dominance.  The practical result 
has varied.  In 2007, advocates coalesced in opposition to 
proposals before the Board to truncate minimum standards for 
jails that the Board had established three decades earlier.  The 
proposed changes, proffered by the Department of Correction, 
among other things would have reduced permitted cell sizes, 
cut back contact visits, subjected inmates in need of protection 
to twenty-three-hour lock-in status, and eliminated required 
Spanish-language translation at all jails. 
The proposals generated vociferous objection.  Many of the 
complaints centered on the Board’s reliance on the Department 
of Correction, its apparent acquiescence to the administrative 
demands of senior departmental leadership, and the majority’s 
seeming indifference to outside opinion—no matter how expert.  
The proposals would have made institutional life more difficult 
for inmates and allowed the department to save money without 
affording commensurate benefits.  One group of experienced 
prison overseers wrote that “the board has squandered its 
independence . . . .  An oversight body must not become part of 
 
David Rohde, City Board Asks to Step in to Oversee Jail Health Care, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21,1998, at B3. 
16. See, e.g., Maurice Carroll, McGrath Quits, Jail Post; Says He Was 
Not Ousted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1971, at A1. 
17. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 626(a). 
18. Id. 
5
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the political practicalities of the day.”19  In my testimony before 
the Board, I was blunter: 
 
When the watcher and the watched become too 
close, when they share not simply common goals 
but common activities, the oversight agency no 
longer acts independently, and it fails in its 
purpose . . . .  With regret, I believe that your 
proposals to revise the minimum standards 
reflect your loss of independence and, 
accordingly, your failure to fulfill the purpose for 
which the board was created some [fifty] years 
ago, and to follow the example created by the 
board during the years in which it had its most 
sustained impact on the Department of 
Correction.  Here, you give the appearance of a 
behind-the-scenes partnership with the 
Department of Correction . . . .20 
 
Facing severe public pressure, the Board rejected all but 
two of the proposed amendments to the minimum standards.  
Since the 2007 controversy, new board members, appointed by 
the presiding justices of the Appellate Divisions, the City 
Council, and the mayor himself, seem to offer a degree of 
activism and a willingness to assert independence from the 
Department of Correction. 
While some correctional administrators may not welcome 
the presence of outsiders, others concede the watchdog’s virtue.  
According to Martin Horn, the New York City correction 
commissioner at the time, “[t]he role of oversight” is “critical to 
the operations of prisons and jails in democratic societies.”21  
 
19. Michael B. Mushlin, John Horan, David Lenefsky, Madeline deLone, 
John M. Brickman & Clay Hiles, Independent Oversight of N.Y. Jails, N.Y. 
L.J., May 17, 2007, at 2, available at 
http://www.law.pace.edu/news/inTheNews/Mushlin%20op%20ed%20NYLJ.05
07.pdf.. 
20. John M. Brickman, Address before the New York City Board of 
Correction (Apr. 17, 2007), available at 
www.nycjailreform.org/documents/CA/CA_Brickman.doc.  
21. Clyde Haberman, NYC; Breaking the Chains of Inhumanity, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 2004, at B1.  At the “Opening of a Closed World” conference, 
Mr. Horn noted that prison oversight “makes you better” and moves the 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/13
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Yet challenge to oversight by civilians, whose primary 
vocational interests are not in the corrections field, comes 
easily.  So too do efforts by administrators to truncate 
overseers’ access to facilities, the civilian agencies’ critical 
right.  For the Correctional Association, it happened as early as 
184722 and has remained an issue into the twenty-first century.  
In 2004, the Association sued the New York State Department 
of Correctional Services to enjoin new restrictions on its 
visitation rights.23 
The value of civilian monitors to inmates and their families 
is intuitively obvious, indeed axiomatic.  The New York 
experience, however, demonstrates that civilian overseers also 
bring benefits to prisons and their administrators.  For 
example: 
 
 Citizen volunteers, who are often prominent 
in their communities and active in 
government, can influence legislators and 
budget officials.  These relationships provide 
support for corrections administrators, who 
might be well-advised to forego blanket 
resistance to overseers’ calls for increased 
budget allocations and enhanced programs.  
Prison professionals can make these civilians 
their allies in demanding a larger budget 
share (or, in difficult economic times, 
maintenance of existing appropriations). 
 Their status in the community places many 
civilian monitors in favorable positions to 
influence journalists, editorial writers, and 
media outlets.  At a time when correctional 
administrators need all available assistance, 
they can look to overseers to help make their 
case to the public. 
 
administrator toward fulfillment of an important goal, the need to be self-
reflective. 
22. See ILAN K. REICH, A CITIZEN CRUSADE FOR PRISON REFORM: THE 
HISTORY OF THE CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK 13-14 (1994). 
23. See Paul von Zielbauer, Prison Officials and Monitors are Headed for 
a New Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, at B1; Haberman, supra note 21. 
7
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 With access to charitable and corporate 
philanthropy, citizen volunteers can match 
corrections personnel to sources of funds for 
non-traditional or innovative activities that 
are not feasible with governmental revenues.  
Furthermore, citizens can facilitate financing 
for demonstration projects that might later 
receive public funding.24 
 Civilian overseers can provide “cover” to 
administrators who wish to take steps that 
may be unpopular within their 
departments.25 
 Endorsements by oversight agencies give 
“street cred,” or helpful external 
endorsement, to good work by corrections 
administrators and line-level professionals.26 
 The presence of the civilian overseer keeps 
professional administrators at the top of their 
game, to the collective benefit of the 
government, staff, and inmates. 
 
Each of the New York models offers advantages and 
presents drawbacks.  The non-governmental organization, 
exemplified by the Correctional Association, can maintain 
 
24. In the years following its revival in 1970, the Board of Correction 
won foundation grants for a variety of projects in city facilities.  These 
included a program that brought hundreds of volunteer clergy to visit jail 
housing units, a program to provide prenatal services to pregnant inmates 
(after the program demonstrated its effectiveness, the city administration 
assumed the funding responsibility), a project that recruited volunteers to 
teach literacy to inmates, and other activities otherwise unavailable for lack 
of resources.  See N.Y. CITY BD. OF CORR., ANNUAL REPORT (1972); N.Y. CITY 
BD. OF CORR., ANNUAL REPORT (1973). 
25. For example, in and after 2007, when the New York State 
Department of Correctional Services sought to close institutions for 
budgetary and other reasons, the support of the Correctional Association 
helped overcome resistance by correctional staff unions protecting members’ 
jobs and municipal officials, who feared the impact of prison shutdowns on 
local economies.  See Nicholas Confessore, Spitzer Seeks Way to Find State 
Prisons He Can Close, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2007, at B1; Robert Gangi, Ease 
State Budget Woes by Closing More Prisons, NEWSDAY, Nov. 12, 2009. 
26. Administrators might welcome more of this praise: “Mr. [Martin] 
Horn said it wouldn't kill monitors to throw more bouquets when they see 
things going right.”  Haberman, supra note 21. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/13
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leadership that is less likely to change arbitrarily with 
corresponding shifts in the political landscape.27  The 
government body, such as the Board of Correction, is 
susceptible to budgetary variations in lean times or because of 
political disagreement with agency activities, with particular 
risk when it challenges a jail administration that enjoys the 
mayor’s favor.  The not-for-profit organization, however, must 
also sustain itself—similarly an issue in a downturn—and 
must continually devote substantial resources and the 
attention of senior personnel to development issues and 
activities.28 
The principal power of the Correctional Association is its 
ability to visit and inspect the prison, return to the outside 
world, and report its findings.  Its authority, of course, has 
been bolstered by its 166 years of activity and its credibility 
among legislators, the media, the criminal justice system, and 
broader communities.  The Board of Correction also enjoys the 
right to visit the jails, emerge, and report, but since 1977, its 
principal power has been rooted in its standard-setting 
function.  Although dissatisfied mayoral administrations have 
suggested abolishing the Board and hence vitiating this 
authority, public pressure and resistance from the City Council 
have thwarted these efforts.29  Moreover, the decentralized 
appointment process has tempered, if not eliminated, the risk 
of mayoral dominance.  And perhaps precisely because when 
the Board speaks it does so as an agency of government, its 
challenges to the system seem more likely to be newsworthy 
than the voice of a private, although venerable, organization. 
To which model should a jurisdiction seeking to establish 
or strengthen a correctional oversight function look?  Each 
 
27. Ironically, the incumbent Executive Director of the Correctional 
Association has held the post since 1982, while there have been only four 
executive directors of the Board of Correction since its revitalization in 1970; 
the last has held the post since 1983.  Neither job offers formal tenure or civil 
service protection, but the point remains that the public employee position is 
more likely to turn over frequently, the Board of Correction experience 
notwithstanding. 
28. The Correctional Association generates operating revenues from 
foundations, private and corporate contributors, and government grants for 
targeted programs.  Since 2007, it has also enjoyed a significant endowment 
that stems from its sale of a Manhattan building that it had owned and 
occupied for some 120 years.  
29. See, e.g., Clines, supra note 15; Mitchell, supra note 15. 
9
2010] THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 1571 
offers advantages and risks and there seems little reason to 
favor one paradigm over the other.  Either approach, or a 
combination of both, will benefit the public good. 
Werner von Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, an axiom 
of physics, teaches that the fact of observation will alter the 
subatomic reaction being investigated.  Watching something 
affects its course.  In facilities that confine people, the presence 
of civilian overseers humanizes everyone—inmates and staff—
and makes the prison a better, more effective, and more 
enlightened institution for all. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/13
